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Immigration and Agriculture in the 1990s 
WALLACE E HUFFMAN 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (!RCA) con-
tained provisions having the intent of changing the supply and de-
mand for labor in the United States and alleviating many social prob-
lems associated with earlier illegal immigration. Many of the propo-
nents of IRCA were optimistic in the mid-1980s about how IRCA 
would slow illegal immigration. Issues of fairness to workers had 
been addressed by legalizing individuals who had a history of work-
ing as undocumented workers in U.S. agriculture and the rest of the 
economy; needs for a short-term guaranteed supply of seasonal agri-
cultural service workers to agriculture had been taken care of in new 
SAW (Special Agricultural Worker) and RAW (Replenishment Agri-
cultural Worker) programs; penalties for U.S. employers who hired 
undocumented workers were imposed; and the INS was supposed 
to tighten border controls and greatly reduce illegal immigration rates. 
In the mid-1980s, some believed that IRCA would permanently solve 
the problems associated with illegal immigration to the United States. 
The Report of the Commission on Agricultural Workers (USCAW 1993) 
summarized the reasons why !RCA failed to meet its objectives. Some 
had anticipated that the technology of document counterfeiting might 
be advancing more rapidly than the technology of counterfeit-docu-
ment detection and that these problems could be sufficiently great to 
subvert the intentions of IRCA. A more basic problem, however, 
seemed to underlie IRCA's poor performance. This problem was the 
huge wage (and standard-of-living) differential between Mexico and 
the United States that existed during the 1980s. Wage differences have 
continued to differ by factors on the order of 8 to 15 ti.mes, and stan-
dard-of-living differences seem similar. IRCA did not directly address 
the large incentives that Mexicans, especially low-wage ones, have 
for meeting the conditions for SAW status and for continuing to 
migrate illegally for work to the United States. These incentives have 
[425] 
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not changed appreciably since the mid-1980s, and a North American 
Free Trade area is ~ne of the few prospects on the horizon that might 
eventually reduce mtercountry wage and income differences. 
. The economic forces behind international trade in labor and ag-
ricultural coi:iunodities.were addressed by Torok and Huffman (1986). 
The econo?'1c foundations of this chapter continue to be applicable, 
and estab.lishment of~ ~orth American Free Trade Area might re-
duce barners to trade m final commodities, although it does not cur-
rently address international migration. 
The objective of this chapter is to summarize a few key effects of 
IR~A on U.S. agriculture and the U.S. economy, and to examine likely 
major developments in immigration issues facing agriculture during 
the 1990s. 
A Few Key Effects of IRCA 
A l.Arge Increase in I.Abar Supply 
IRCA appears to have had a much larger short-term and long-
term impact on the U.S. labor supply of low-skilled labor than ex-
pected. First, the applications/ approvals and the regular amnesty and 
SAW programs were much larger than pre-IRCA forecasts. Over 
1,759,000 individuals who were illegal aliens and claimed continu-
ous residency in the United States between January 1, 1982 and May 
1, 1986 could apply for immediate U.S. resident status. About 1,655,000 
individuals were approved and given rights to work anywhere in the 
United States. Only a very small share of these individuals (maybe 
4%) appear to have been or to be employed in U.S. agriculture. Other 
undocumented workers, who had worked at least 90 days in U.S. 
seasonal agricultural services (SAS) field work during April 30, 1985 
to May 1, 1986, could apply for SAW status (USCAW 1993). 
About 1,272,000 individuals applied for SAW status and about 
1,037,000 previously illegal workers were granted SAW status, which 
gave them immediate temporary U.S. resident status and authoriza-
tion to work in any occupation. The number of SAWs approved was 
much larger than expected (Mines, Gabbard, and ~amardick 19~3). 
Both programs covered individual workers, but did not author~e 
legal status for family members who did not also m~t the special 
provisions. SAWs could later apply for permanent resident status. 
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Second, the new workers legalized under IRCA were largely Span-
ish speaking and had attained a low level of schooling. English-speak-
ing ability was generally poor, and most had strong ties to families 
and friends back home in Mexico. A large share of these individuals 
chose to be part of a transnational labor force, with strong local ties to 
a geographical area (and friends) in both the United States and in a 
foreign country (largely Mexico). 
Given the new legal status and improved U.S. earning potential 
of the legalized workers, they became an international transfer agent 
for bringing more illegal undocumented workers to the United States. 
This occurred in the following way: These legalized workers were 
able to purchase better cars and trucks (transportation services) and 
had more resources to spend on family living, so they frequently 
brought undocumented family members and other relatives and 
friends to the United States when they returned from their home-
land. Thus, workers legalized under IRCA seem to have had a multi-
plier effect on available low-skilled labor. This was totally unantici-
pated, and nobody really knows exactly what the multiplier has been. 
It was undoubtedly reduced somewhat by the economic recession 
that started in 1990 and for which the recovery in employment has 
been very slow (USPres. 1993). Also, U.S. real wage rates for high 
school dropouts declined by 18.2 percent for the decade 1979-89 
(Mishel and Bernstein 1993). 
Third, because of the low average schooling attainment and poor 
English-speaking ability of new IRCA workers, there was a large de-
gree of occupational immobility. Also, the SAWs are seasonal work-
ers and have a high frequency of returning to their home country. 
These are all factors that slowed their integration into mainstream 
U.S. culture and society, slowed their learning of English, and greatly 
lowered their exit rate from SAS work (Mines, Gabbard, and 
Samardick 1993). Thus, both the short-term and long-term effects of 
the SAW program on availability of SAS (and probably other low-
skilled) labor has been much greater than anticipated. 
Furthermore, this long-term persistence for work in the same lo-
cation has created incentives for permanent settlements in rural ar-
eas, particularly in California, Washington, Oregon, Texas, and Florida 
(USCAW 1993). These settlements have greatly increased the demand 
for low-priced housing services and for social services for largely a 
Spanish-speaking culture. 
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A Modest Decline in Real Wage Rates 
The conclusions in the overall Report of the Commission on Agricul-
t u ra/ Workers and in the research reports (USCAW Staff 1993, Duffield 
and Vrooman 1993) were that !RCA did not have any significant ef-
fect on U.S. wage rates, either the farm wage rate or the farm wage 
relative to the nonfarm wage rate. Furthermore, the empirical evi-
dence presented in these chapters largely supports this conclusion. 
However !RCA may have caused a decline in the real earnings of 
fa rm an~ nonfarm workers. My evidence supports the conclusion that 
IRCA d1d not change the wages of farm labor relative to the wages of 
nonfarm labor. The data that I used were taken from CAW's report 
(USCAW Staff 1993, p. 792; see also Duffield and Vrooman 1993). 
What are the reasons for my new interpretation of roughly simi-
lar economic information? First, the argument developed in the pre-
vious section of this chapter was that !RCA had a much larger impact 
on the available supply of low-skilled labor (for example, high school 
dropouts) in the United States than expected. This is an outcome that 
implies a larger impact on U.S. wage rates than what would have 
b<.>en anticipated in pre-IRCA years. Second, considerable evidence 
exists that all U.S. (and Mexican) labor markets, differentiated by skill 
type and geographical location, are interconnected through labor 
mobility (migrating and training). Economic incentives in the form 
of a positive compensating differential are generally required to in-
duce individuals to change their human capital stocks, including geo-
graphical migration for work. See the research by Rosen (1986), Torok 
and l Iuffman (1986), Tokle and Huffman (1991), and Huffman (1993b). 
Furthermore, Huffman (1980), Tokle and Huffman (1991), and 
lluffman (1993b) show that U.S. farm and nonfarm labor markets 
have bt..>come highly integrated during the past25 years, and Huffman 
(l 993b) shows that compensating differentials, after an allowance for 
the cost of living and the likelihood of being employed, are now very 
small across the United States. Thus, these are arguments that it would 
be unusual to find an effect of !RCA on the ratio of farm-to-nonfarm 
wage rates. These arguments are leading up to the hypothesis that 
we would expect !RCA to have caused a more rapid rate of decline of 
the real farm wage rate and real nonfarm wage rate than what would 
have occurred without IRCA. 
Figures 22.1and22.2 present plots of the real manufacturing wage 
and real farm wage during 1975-91. In creating these plots, I have 
chosen to deflate nominal wage rates using the deflator f~r person~ 
consumption expenditures from the Bureau of EconoIDJc Analysis 
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(National Income and Product Accounts) rather than the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). The reason for the switch in deflators is that during 
1978-85 the CPI contained a major flaw. It used the nominal interest 
rate on new home mortgages as a key indicator of the price of ser-
vices of owner-occupied housing. When U.S. nominal interest rates 
were deregulated in 1978-79, interest rates on new home mortgages 
rose abruptly; and given that housing has a weight of about 30 per-
cent in the CPI, the CPI rose "too" rapidly during 1978-85. The rise of 
the CPI during 1978-85 was 5.2 percent larger than for the deflator of 
personal consumption expenditures. Thus, real wage rates, obtained 
using the CPI as the deflator, fell too rapidly or rose too slowly dur-
ing 197$-.85. Thus, the pattern of real wage rates reported in Figures 
221 and 22.2 for the period 1978-85 are quite different from those 
reported in the Report of the Commission on Agricultural Workers 
(USCAW 1993). 
Figure 22.1. Real Nonfarm Wage in the United States and Selected 
Regions, 1975-91 
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Figure 22.2. Real Farm Wage in the United States and Selected Regions, 
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In judging the performance of wage rates, I have chosen to focus 
on the U.S. average and on averages for California, Florida, and Texas-
Oklahoma. The latter three areas were chosen because of the large 
contributions they make to SAS labor use. In particular, the real manu-
facturing wage in the United States (and Florida) peaked in 1978 (real 
compensation peaked later in the mid-1980s because of the value of 
benefits rising more rapidly than wage rates) and then declined slowly. 
The real manufacturing wage for California and the southern plains 
states peaked in 1982. Real manufacturing wage rates for California, 
Florida, and Texas-Oklahoma declined after 1982, but the rate of de-
cline accelerated after the passage of !RCA in 1986. Recall that the 
real gross national product (GNP) grew through the second quarter 
of 1990 (USPres. 1993). 
The pattern of the real farm wage during 1975-91 is more irregu-
lar than for the real manufacturing wage. The U.S. real wage for farm 
labor peaked in 1981, fell steadily during 1981-85, and recovered some-
what after 1985. The real farm wage in California and Florida peaked 
during the late 1970s and then declined until 1983. The real Califor-
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nia farm wage recovered some during 1983-89 and then declined 
sharply. In Florida, the real wage rose during 1982-88, then declined 
a little. The pattern of the real Texas-Oklahoma farm wage is some-
what different. It has a positive trend from 1975-84, and then a strong 
negative trend emerges. The break in 1989 is quite sharp and may be 
partially related to a hard winter freeze in the lower Rio Grande area. 
Thus, the patterns that emerge in Figures 22.1 and 22.2 are some-
what different than those presented by the CAW (USCAW Staff 1993). 
The next step was to see if these differences are statistically signifi-
cant. Table 22.1 presents econometric results from regressing the natu-
ral logarithm of real wage rates to a general time trend and to a post-
IRCA trend. The results show an estimated average annual rate of 
change in real wage rates during 1975-88 and an average annual 
change in real wage rates during 1989-91. 
Why did I choose 1989 as the first post-IRCA year? Although IRCA 
was passed late in 1986, its legal interpretation and exact procedures 
for the general worker amnesty and the SAW programs were still to 
be defined. Furthermore, processing of worker applications under 
IRCA was slowed because of the much larger than anticipated appli-
cation rates. Furthermore, even after a majority of the applications 
was processed, additional time was required for the newly legalized 
workers to realize additional earnings and modify behavior in accor-
dance. Also, IRCA had attempted to impose stiff employer penalties 
for hiring undocumented workers, and some time was required be-
fore the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice could work out satisfactory procedures. In fact, the 
INS chose largely to ignore farm employer sanctions because of the 
large penalties that might be imposed on employers if they discrimi-
nated against a legal worker in the process of checking documents 
carefully for legal status to work in the United States. High-quality 
counterfeit documents were frequently easier to obtain than real docu-
ments. Thus, I have chosen to include the wage rates for the transi-
tional period of 1986-88 in the pre-IRCA years. (An alternative would 
have been to exclude wage rates for these years from the statistical 
analysis.) 
In Table 22.1, section ill, the fitted equations explain the farm-
wage manufacturing wage ratio. They do not show any pre- or post-
IRCA trend that is statistically significant. This conclusion supports 
the the CAW's report. Also, the farm manufacturing average wage 
differential over 1975-91 is largest for the U.S. average (70%). It is 
smallest for Florida; but the farm manufacturing wage rates are not 
significantly different. In California and Texas-Oklahoma, the farm 
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Table 22.1. Regression Equation Retention of Real Farm and Nonfarm 
Wage Rates and Relative Wage Rates to a General lime Trend 
and Post-IRCA Trend, 197~91 
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wage is on average 40 percent and 63 percent lower than the manu-
facturing wage, respectively. 
In Table 22.1, section II, the results show that the real U.S. manu-
facturing wage declined at an average rate of 0.40 percent per year 
during 1975-88 and the average rate of decline accelerated to 0.43 
percent per year during 1989-91. In particular, the change in the rate 
of decline of the U.S. real manufacturing wage during 1989-91 is sig-
nificantly different from zero. The behavior of the real manufactur-
ing wage in California, Florida, and Texas-Oklahoma is somewhat 
different. In particular, the real manufacturing wage in Texas-Okla-
homa does not have any significant trend during 1975-88. The post-
IRCA behavior of the real manufacturing wage in these states is simi-
lar. The average rate of decline of the real manufacturing wage is larger 
during 1989-91 than during 1975-88. Furthermore, a joint test that 
the coefficient for these three areas are jointly equal to zero is soundly 
rejected at the 5 percent significance level. Thus, we have evidence 
that IRCA increased the rate of decline of the real wage in manufac-
turing in major SAS labor-using states and in the United States over-
all. This negative post-1988 effect of IRCA on the real wage might be 
associated with other non-IRCA-induced economic effects, but I re-
main skeptical. 
In Table 22.1, section I, the results show an average annual rate of 
decline of the U.S. real farm wage of 0.4 percent during 1975-88. The 
average rate of decline of this wage during 1989-91 is not signifi-
cantly different than during 1975-89. In California, the average rate 
of decline of the real farm wage during 1975-88 was 0.3 percent and 
for Florida, 0.6 percent; but for Texas-Oklahoma, the real farm wage 
did not have a trend that was significantly different from zero (1975-
88). Among these regions, however, Texas-Oklahoma is the only one 
that shows a more rapid average rate of decline of the real farm wage 
during 1989-91 than during 1975-88. However, the average rate of 
decline of .08 percent in Texas-Oklahoma during 1989-91 is smaller 
than for California and Florida for 1975-91. 
My tentative conclusion from this preliminary econometric evi-
dence is that IRCA did have a statistically significant effect on U.S. 
wage rates. It appears to have increased the rate of decline of the 
nonfarm real wage rate from what it would otherwise have been. 
IRCA, however, did not have a statistically significant effect on the 
ratio of farm-to-nonfarm wage rates because the farm and nonfarm 
highly interlinked within each state and across states. Low-skilled 
Mexican workers do earn less than more highly skilled U.S. citizen 
workers, but the low-skilled and the higher-skilled labor markets are 
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also interconnected and compensating differentials appear to have 
been unaffected by IRCA. Thus, IRCA may have contributed to the 
very slow apparent recovery of jobs for U.S. citizens from the busi-
ness-cycle downturn starting in 1990 by providing newly legalized 
and new illegal workers with employment. 
Also, because of the low average schooling and poor English of 
new IRCA workers, much greater occupational immobility appears 
to have occurred than was anticipated. The SAWs in particular are 
seasonal workers and have a high return frequency to their home 
country, Mexico. These are all factors that have slowed their integra-
tion into the broader U.S. culture and society and their exit from SAS 
labor. Thus, the long-term effect of the SAW program on SAS crops is 
greater than could have been anticipated. Furthermore, this long-term 
persistence has created incentives for permanent settlements in rural 
locations, such as in rural California, Oregon, Washington, and Florida, 
that was not anticipated. This has greatly increased the demand for 
low-priced housing services and social services for a largely Spanish-
speaking culture. 
Changes in Demand for Labor and Trade 
The changes in demand for SAS labor are derived largely from 
changes in demand for U.S. horticultural and nursery crops and tech-
nical change in the production of these crops. Table 22.2 presents in-
formation on the quantity of major horticultural crops harvested in 
1987, and provides an indication of the amount of work to be done in 
harvesting these crops. Oranges, apples, grapes, and tomatoes stand 
out for their large quantities. Table 22.3 ties these crops into 12 SAS or 
farm-labor regions. California (Region I) and Florida (Region II) stand 
out for having unusually large areas and quantities of SAS horticul-
tural crops relative to all other regions. 
In Table 22.4, some selective trends in the U.S. consumption of 
fruits and vegetables are summarized. This table shows that over the 
period 1985-86 to 1989-90 there was a 5.6 percent reduction in per 
capita total consumption of fruits and berries. The consumption of 
fresh fruit and berries decreased by a larger rate of 6.5 percent. Per 
capita fresh citrus was, however, unchanged over this period. 
The U.S. consumption of vegetables, melons, and mushrooms 
increased significantly during 1985-86 to 1989-90. The rate was more 
rapid for fresh the largest increase in this class of horticultural crops, 
17.4 percent for fresh and 13.6 percent for total green vegetables. The 
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Table 2.2.2.. United States: Number of Farms, Area in O rchards, Vines, 
Vegetables, and Nursery Crops, by Major Crops, 1987 
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Table 22.3. Area and Quantity Harvested of Tree Crops, Grapes and Berries, Vegetables, 
and Nursery and Greenhouse Crops, by Proposed SAS Farm Labor Regions, 1987 
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Table 22.4. Rate and Growth of Fruit and Vegetable Consumption in the 
United States, Selected Years, 1979- 90 
l!acc1a11u11 C61ag1 
aJ£1c11g1 Ill[ IOllllilll IOllDILlmllllllD lib.I 1979-80 1986-86 
Type Produce 1979-80 1986-86 1989-90 to 1989-90 to 1989-90 
En.till IDll D1ml11: 
Citrus: Total 36.6 36.6 32.7 -11.0 -1 0.9 
Fresh 26.9 24.1 23.9 ·1 1.4 -0.1 
Noncitrus: Total 80.1 96.9 93.0 14.8 -4.1 
Fresh 59.8 78.0 72.0 18.6 -8.0 
Total Fruits & Berries: Total 113.6 123.6 125.7 7 .6 ·6.6 
Fresh 86.6 102.3 95.9 10.2 -6.5 
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Green vegetables: Total 52.5 50.0 67.3 8 .7 13.6 
Fresh 34.3 33.0 39.3 13.6 17.4 
Tomatoes: Total 76.6 78.8 85.8 11 .4 8.6 
Fresh 12.5 16.4 16.0 24.7 3.8 
Potatoes, total all types 115.9 124.1 128.4 10.2 3.4 
Other vegetables, melons 
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Fresh 98.0 107.3 118.8 19.2 10.2 
Source: Huffman 1993, p759, Table 5. 
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growth in per capita total consumption of tomatoes was 8.5 percent 
and of fresh was 3.8 percent. The consumption of fresh, nongreen (or 
yellow) vegetables also grew at the relatively rapid rate of 7.5 per-
cent. 
Thus, the growth in domestic demand for these horticultural prod-
ucts shifted toward green and yellow vegetables and away from fruits 
and berries. This trend seems likely to continue into the mid-90s and 
suggests greater growth for SAS labor in vegetable, melon, and mush-
room production than in fruits and berries. Technical labor-saving 
advances might, however, modify this trend. 
The potential for international trade in horticultural crops seems 
likely to change during the 1990s. First, IRCA has reduced the real 
wage in the United States, and this seems likely to have reduced the 
quantity demanded of horticultural products imported from Mexico 
and other countries. TIUs is based largely on the implications from 
the multi.equation agricultural trade and immigration model by Torok 
and Huffman (1986) and Huffman (1986). Furthermore, because a large 
share of the SAWs are relatively young, they can be expected to have 
impacts on U.S. labor availability for all of the decade of the 1990s. 
Second, lowering the wage for SAS labor has undoubtedly in-
creased U.S. exports of labor-intensive horticultural products-ones 
in which the United States has a comparative advantage, for example, 
citrus, grapes, apples, peaches, and lettuce exports to Canada. These 
conclusions are based on a selective summary of U.S.-Canadian and 
U.S.-Mexican trading patterns in horticultural products (see Table 
22.5), and an econometric analysis of U.S. exports of fresh lettuce to 
Canada (Huffman 1986). TIUs latter study showed a large impact of a 
lower California farm wage rate on the quality of U.S. fresh lettuce 
exported to Canada during 1956-83. These results seem likely to ap-
ply broadly to exports of other labor-intensive horticultural crops. 
The North American Free Trade Area (NAFrA) seems likely to 
also change trade patterns in horticultural products between the 
United States and its neighbors, Mexico and Canada. My forecasts 
are based on an examination of current trade patterns and geographi-
cal locations of product, especially relative to the borders, as follows. 
Products that are currently produced in the United States but near 
the Mexican border will most likely move to Mexico in time (Huffman 
1993). These are crops that are produced in southern California, Ari-
zona, New Mexico, and Texas. Cuban producers are also likely to 
become strong competitors in the future with those in south Florida, 
Louisiana, California, and Hawaii. These are largely crops for the 
winter and early spring U.S. fresh fruit and vegetable markets: toma-
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toes, cucumbers, peppers, cantaloupes, broccoli, melons, cauliflower, 
cabbage, onions, sugar, and pineapple. The United States might also 
lose a little market to Canada, particularly in tuber potatoes, carrots, 
and apples. 
The United States can, however, expect to experience some in-
creases in demand for exports of horticultural products from its neigh-
bors to the north and south. During the 1990s the market potential is 
much larger in Canada than Mexico. Increases appear likely for cit-
rus, grapes, peaches, pears, and plum exports to Canada. For Mexico, 
additional exports seem most likely for pears and plums. 
Conclusions 
IRCA has had some expected but also many unexpected effects 
in the United States. It increased the quantity supplied of low-skilled 
labor, as expected, but it had the unexpected effect of contributing to 
the immigration of additional undocumented individuals . Although 
the initial estimates of the depressing effects of IRCA on real U.S. 
wage rates were less than expected, the analysis presented here brings 
with it the conclusion that IRCA did in fact reduce U.S. real wage 
rates - both farm and nonfarm - and that these effects were largely 
diffused throughout the United States. When data for the 1990s be-
come available, more research to quantify these effects is needed. 
During the 1990s, the growth in demand for green and yellow 
vegetables appears likely to be larger than for fruits and berries. Be-
cause vegetables are grown largely on or close to the ground, techni-
cal advances in labor-saving devices can occur more rapidly than for 
tree crops. The decade of the 1990s appears, however, likely to have 
unusually low average rates of growth of aggregate labor demand. 
This means that higher real wage rates are unlikely to provide much 
incentive to undertake costly mechanization. Furthermore, if modes t 
limits are placed on welfare tenure, many welfare recipients may need 
to take work. Their re-entry into the U.S. labor force during the de-
cade of the 1990s could put further downward pressure on the real 
U.S. wage rates of largely low-skilled workers. 
Comparisons for economic conditions of transnational popula-
tion groups that spent part of each year in the United States and part 
in a low- or moderate-income country are difficult. Because housing, 
health, and environmental goods have large income elasticities, U.S. 
standards for these goods generally exceed by a large margin the stan-
dards in the originating countries of immigrants. Thus, substandard 
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U.S. conditions, which immigrants frequently face in agriculture and 
some other sectors, may equal or exceed standard conditions for these 
goods in their originating countries. One can see that comparisons of 
economic conditions of immigrants most likely should be made rela-
tive to the originating country and to the United States and an aver-
age computed. 
It is easy to see that the economic incentives for further immigra-
tion of undocumented persons can be expanded beyond those in-
cluded in real wage differences when illegal immigrants are given 
access to most social services of U.S. citizens. To help control access to 
jobs and social services, the United States needs a genuine personal 
identification system; otherwise, it will ultimately extend work op-
portunities and social program coverage to a large share of the popu-
lation of Mexico and Central America. Some people might find this 
to be fair, but the financial reality is that the burden of paying for 
extending social program benefits will fall on U.S. citizens; there is 
no "deep pocket" elsewhere to pay, and outsiders can obtain greater 
benefits only if U.S. citizens on average receive fewer benefits than 
otherwise would be the case. U.S. citizens might be prepared to greatly 
extend access to jobs and social services to a much larger population, 
but these are choices that they and politicians should confront 
directly. 
For !RCA-legalized individuals and their families, the issue of 
who pays for their social services seems likely to become a growing 
concern during the decade of the 1990s. Should growers' associations 
or consumers pay? Should local governments, state governments, or 
the federal government pay? Although some people believe that most 
of the benefits from cheap( er) SAS labor (and other technologies) go 
into larger profits of growers and processors of agricultural prod-
ucts, this is not the case. Except for a few specialty crops, there are a 
relatively large number of U.S. producers of agricultural products 
compared to U.S. manufacturers of cars, televisions, and washing 
machines, etc. Competition among these producers results in the ben-
efits of cheap( er) labor and improved technologies being transferred 
rather quickly to consumers in lower (than otherwise would be the 
case) prices of agricultural products (Huffman and Evenson 1993). 
For example, over the period 1978-92, the prices received by U.S. farm-
ers decreased by 3.9 percent per year relative to the prices of all goods 
purchased by U.S. consumers (measured with the implicit price de-
flator for personal consumption expenditures). Prices paid by U.S. 
farmers for inputs relative to this same consumer price index declined 
by only 1.1 percent per year over the same period. Consumers could 
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decide that their food is cheap enough and not want lower food costs 
because of the use of cheap labor or new technologies. 
Because consumers largely benefit and they are spread through-
out the United States, the local and state governments are inefficient 
agencies for providing, collecting revenues for, and paying for these 
social services. Furthermore, local differences in programs can have 
major effects on the choice of the exact location of U.S. residence. Per-
haps the federal government should bear a major share of the cost 
and use excise or income tax receipts to pay for them. 
Although some of the problems of agricultural labor are attrib-
uted to the farm labor contractors (FLCs) who serve as intermediar-
ies, this institution exists and has expanded largely because of eco-
nomic incentives in federal and state legislation. The FLCs, as other 
businesses that provide employers with temporary employees, be-
came profitable when the economic incentives for inter- versus 
intrafirm transactions changed. This was one of the important issues 
considered by Coase (1952) in his noted article, first printed in 1937, 
on the nature of the firm and the importance of transaction costs, 
which was expanded on by Stigler (1951) and Rosen (1983). IRCA 
and some preceding federal legislation raised the relative cost of 
intrafirm labor transactions relative to the use of outside farm labor 
contractors. Hence, it is not surprising that FLCs grew rapidly as a 
source of SAS labor during 1986-92 (Mines, Gabbard, and Samardick 
1993). This is just another example of how new legislation changes 
economic incentives and the extent of use of institutions in unantici-
pated ways, as economic agents attempt to minimize the impacts of 
legislative and other changes on their expected well-being. 
Much greater effort is needed to examine the likely implications 
of a North American Free Trade Area on labor and product markets. 
The advances over the past 15 years in computer technologies and 
communications have facilitated the breaking of previous long manu-
facturing processes into a sequence of smaller processes that can be 
contracted out to the lowest cost producer in the world economy. Fi-
nal assembly of the components may occur in a moderately advanced 
country or near the sight of ultimate use of the final good, depending 
on the nature of trade policies. Modem manufacturers have, how-
ever, made domestic content policies a farce, as they find ways to get 
around them. These changes have increased greatly the competition 
that high school dropouts and other low-skilled U.S. people face in 
the U.S. labor market. It is competition that will not go away, and 
agriculture will feel the pressure, too. Much research is needed that 
combines theories &om international trade, labor economics, and 
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public choice economics with good econometric expertise into an 
empirical examination of trade and immigration issues facing North 
America. 
In conclusion, IR.CA has revealed many surprises. More undoubt-
edly will occur. Furthermore, the conclusions presented by Torok and 
Huffman (1986) for dealing with illegal immigration still stand. It is a 
complex problem involving factor and product markets, trade and 
immigration policies of both countries, and general policies affecting 
economic growth and social policies. No easy fixes exist! 
